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Abstract. We study how electronic markets that facilitate broader inter-firm transactions
affect the vertical scope of emerging IT-enabled extended enterprises. We do so by modeling firms
in a three-tier value chain who are each connected to a common electronic market that facilitates
direct business transactions across tiers, and that lowers the search costs associated with finding an
appropriate trading partner for each of them. The extent to which search costs are reduced depends
on the complexity of B2B search, and the nature of the supporting technologies that the electronic
market facilitates. Variation in search costs affect firms across the value chain in three key ways:
by a change in the transaction costs of interaction between firms; by a change in the contracting
costs associated with outsourcing owing to changes in the costs of moral hazard for delegated
search, and by a change in the price dispersion of upstream input commodities. We capture each of
these effects in a new model that integrates search theory into the principal-agent framework, and
establish that the optimal outsourcing contract has a simple "all or nothing" performance-based
structure under fairly general assumptions. We then apply this model to contrast the effect that
different information technologies have on the relative B2B search costs of different firms in the
value chain, contrasting the predicted changes of proportionate, constant and convergent changes
in search costs. When integrated with a detailed analysis of the nature of B2B search, these
results predicts that when B2B search is information-intensive, electronic markets will facilitate an
increase in outsourcing, market-based transactions and a reduction in the vertical scope of extended
enterprises. In contrast, when B2B search is primarily communication-intensive, electronic markets
will lead to tighter integration and an increase in the vertical scope of the extended enterprise.
Our research suggest that the nature of the information technologies and of the business activities
supported by an electronic market are crucial determinants of the organizational and industry
changes they induce, and our results have important implications for a variety of industries in
which both technological and agency issues will influence the eventual success of global IT-facilitated
extended enterprise initiatives.
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1. Introduction
The IT infrastructure created by investments in electronic B2B markets over the last few years facil-
itates a new array of inter-firm transactions and enterprise forms. As these "extended enterprises"
become increasingly viable, they raise new variants of classic organization design and governance
questions. Since the shared interorganizational systems (IOS) of B2B markets make outsourced
relationships more easily viable, should firms take advantage of these reduced transaction costs to
shrink their scope, and focus on their core competencies, while remaining part of a loosely coupled
extended enterprise? Or rather, should they exploit the fact that these very same shared IOS and
IT platforms of B2B markets facilitate supplier reach and transaction capability across the supply
chain, thereby potentially disintermediating those intermediaries whose business models relied on
transaction costs asymmetries that these electronic markets have largely eliminated, and making
viable an integrated enterprise that extends vertically upstream? At first glance, either scenario
seems to be economically justifiable.
In this paper, we explore this trade-off by studying how electronic business-to-business markets
affect the vertical scope of the extended enterprises that use them. We do so by modeling the
sourcing decision of a downstream firm in a three-tier value chain. Firms in each tier of the value
chain are connected to a common electronic market that facilitates direct business transactions
across tiers, and lowers the search costs associated with the activities of all the firms in the value
chain. In contrast with consumer search, B2B search is considerably more complex and nuanced,
and changes in these search costs induces three key effects: a change in the transaction costs
for firms across the tiers of the value chain; a change in the contracting costs associated with
outsourcing owing to changes in the costs of moral hazard for delegated search, and a change
in the price dispersion of upstream input commodities. We capture each of these effects in a
new model that integrates search theory into the principal-agent framework, and establish that the
1
optimal outsourcing contract has a simple "all or nothing" performance-based structure under fairly
general assumptions. We apply this model to contrast the effect that commonly used information
technologies have on the relative B2B search costs of different firms in the value chain, and establish
conditions under which the electronic market will increase the scope and integration of an extended
enterprise, and conditions under which it will lead to increased outsourcing and a loosely coupled
extended enterprise. These results, along with a detailed analysis of B2B search, lead to a contrast
between information-intensive and communication-intensive search: the effect of IT of each of these
is associated with a different prescribed model for scope and integration.
A simple context that our model describes quite literally is that of procurement outsourcing, a
growing phenomenon enabled by electronic markets. A 2003 survey of senior executives by Accen-
ture found that 9% of companies (projected to grow to 22% by 2006) surveyed used procurement
service providers (PSPs), rather than in-house procurement divisions, for direct materials and ser-
vices, while 20% of them (projected to grow to 43% by 2006) use PSPs for indirect materials and
services. Similarly, a more recent survey (conducted in 2004) by A. T. Kearney, finds that between
9% and 20% of companies outsource procurement activities related to maintenance, repair and
operating supplies (MRO), and 11% to 17% of them outsource procurement activities related to
indirect materials, compared to just 4% to 9% of companies that outsource procurement related to
direct materials. These survey results are striking, because they highlight how the extent of out-
sourcing of the procurement function — often considered of key strategic importance (Wolf, 2005)
— varies between indirect/MRO inputs and direct inputs. Our model suggests these differences,
based on a contrast between the nature of B2B search associated with MRO/indirect inputs and
direct inputs.
In order to place our work in the existing literature we first briefly summarize our model and
its results. We model an industry with a three-tier vertical value chain. There is one downstream
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manufacturer of final goods, an intermediary (tier-1 supplier) to whom the production of complex
parts may be outsourced, and upstream (tier-2) suppliers of commodity or near-commodity inputs
to this complex part3. The outsourcing decision of the manufacturer is influenced by the lowering of
search costs through three effects: (1) a reduction in the direct transaction cost of procurement for
manufacturers, suggesting less outsourcing and higher vertical scope for the extended enterprise,
(2) a reduction in the dispersion of commodity input prices, since these prices and the extent of
dispersion is influenced by the level of search costs, and by who (manufacturer or intermediary)
does the searching, and. (3) reduction in contracting (agency) costs associated with outsourcing,
suggesting more procurement-outsourcing and lower vertical integration for the extended enter-
prise4. Since the manufacturer is usually unable to observe the intermediary’s search effort, it faces
costs associated with moral hazard, the extent of which depends on the intermediary’s search cost
(which may also be lowered by the electronic market), and by the changes in commodity price
dispersion.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we derive the optimal cost-plus outsourcing contract
for the manufacturer, and show that it has a simple two-part structure, with a fixed performance
trigger. This is interesting because we allow the buyer to optimize over contracts of any functional
form, and despite this generality, the optimal contract has a simple and easily implementable form.
Next, we use this optimal contract to frame the make vs. buy decision, and to examine how
this decision is affected by different kinds of changes in relative search costs. First, if B2B search
3An illustrative situation is the auto industry. A manufacturer like General Motors buys most of its car seats,
a complex intermediate part, from an intermediary parts supplier like Delphi. The sourcing of commoditiy inputs
such as plastic and steel, and subsequent production of car seats, could be handled by GM or Delphi, depending on
which company has an overall relative advantage. In fact, it has been handled by both of these companies at different
times, and recent trade press articles suggest that GM may return to in-house sourcing and production of the parts
it currently sources from Delphi (Arndt and Welch, 2005).
4We thus move well beyond simple intuition which suggests that if electronic markets lower the search costs of a
buyer, in a simple buyer-supplier scenario, buyers will outsource more. This ignores the crucial role intermediaries
play in multi-tier industies. When there are many layers of intermediaries as well, electronic markets may lower search
costs for buyers as well as intermediaries. If these markets confer a relative advantage to buyers (intermediaries), then
the buyers (intermediaries) will perform the transactions, which will leading to relatively less (more) outsourcing,
and more (less) vertical scope.
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and transactions are information-intensive, involving collecting and processing product information
from non-personal or published sources, technologies like online product catalogs, Internet-based
supplier portals, and product/price comparison engines induce constant decreases in search costs
across the tiers of the value chain, for both the manufacturer and the intermediary. In this case,
our model shows that the lowering of agency cost dominates the benefits from lower search costs,
leading to more outsourcing, a decrease in vertical integration and a more loosely coupled extended
enterprise. In contrast, if B2B search involves extensive communication (as suggested by the in-
dustrial marketing literature, which we discuss at length later in the paper), then marketplace
communication platforms like EDI, XML and related collaborative systems reduce the unit cost of
each communication iteration/step. B2B search costs then decrease proportionately for the manu-
facturer and intermediary, with the differences reflecting prior expertise and number of iterations
before a final price is obtained. In this case, we show that the decrease in the buyer’s search cost
often dominates the decrease in her contracting costs, which leads to less outsourcing, an increase in
scope, and a more vertical integrated extended enterprise. Finally, if shared procurement technolo-
gies and processes cause search costs for electronic market participants to converge to a common
lower value, our model predicts an increase in vertical integration, though our emphasis is on the
first two scenarios.
Our research adds to a rich and varied literature on information systems and interorganizational
transactions. One might first bifurcate this literature into two broad streams: (1) related to
the organizational issues associated with contracting for and sourcing of information systems and
technologies, and (2) relating to the enabling aspects of information systems in changing interactions
across organizations. The former literature has studied some contracting issues related to ours,
such as its role in software outsourcing (Richmond, Seidmann and Whinston, 1992; Whang, 1992),
contracting and reputation effects in the context of offshore software outsourcing (Banerjee and
Duflo, 2000), how software processes affect offshore software development (Gopal, Mukhopadhyay
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and Krishnan, 2002) and how contractual arrangements help clients derive value from offshore
outsourcing (Gopal, Sivaramakrishnan, Krishnan, and Mukhopadhyay, 2003)..
The latter literature, centered around inter-organizational information systems (IOS), can fur-
ther be divided into three streams: the nature of IOS, the adoption of IOS, and the organiza-
tional/industry impact of IOS.
The nature of IOS: This literature has highlighted, among other things, the need for business
partner re-engineering (Riggins and Mukhopadhyay, 1994), competing approaches to measuring
EDI usage through volume, diversity, breadth and depth of usage (Massetti and Zmud, 1996),
the importance of merging technological and process innovations (Clark and Stoddard, 1996), how
domain expertise confers strategic advantage to firms using IOS (Christiaanse and Venkatraman,
2002), the use of options to integrate spot and long-term contracts in B2B exchanges (Kleindorfer
and Wu, 2003), and why IOS should provide flexibility so that firms can change offerings and
partners (Gosain, Malhotra and El Sawy, 2005).
The adoption of IOS: this literature has examined, among other things, the incentives for buyers
and sellers to invest in IOS (Bakos, 1997), how asset specificity and trust influence IOS adoption
(Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994), the optimal ownership of IOS and the importance of network par-
ticipants to asset productivity (Bakos and Nault, 1997), how external pressure and organizational
readiness affect IOS adoption (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter, 2001), how the codifiability of trans-
actions influences their suitability for B2B exchanges (Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu, 2003), and the
impact of ownership on adoption and exploitation of IOS (Han, Kauffman and Nault, 2004).
The organizational and industry impact of IOS : This literature has examines the impact of
IOS on firm size and scope (Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991), on the number of suppliers and extent
of outsourcing (Clemons, Reddi and Row, 1993; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993), on firm size (Bryn-
jolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil, 1994), and on JIT (Just In Time) practices (Srinivasan,
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Kekre and Mukhopadhyay, 1994). Prior work has also studied how network effects affect IOS adop-
tion and impact (Riggins, Kriebel and Mukhopadhyay, 1994; Wang and Seidmann, 1995; Bhargava
and Choudhary, 2004), and the impact of specific technologies like voice mail on inter-organizational
effectiveness (Lind and Zmud, 1995). The relative benefits to different players in the value chain
has also been investigated: to buyers in the auto industry (Mukhopadhyay, Kekre and Kalathur,
1995), to buyers when IOS drives down search costs (Bakos, 1997), on intermediation (Bailey and
Bakos, 1997; Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, 1998), to sellers who can price-discriminate and
lock in customers to IOS technologies (Grover and Ramanlal, 1999), on vertical integration (Hitt,
1999), on sharing domain expertise (Argyres, 1999), on the optimality of centralization versus
decentralization of decision rights and the resulting performance of a firm facing multiple horizon-
tal markets (Anand and Mendelson, 1997), on policies like vendor managed inventory (VMI) and
continuous replenishment (Raghunathan and Yeh, 2001), and on the emergence of biased versus
unbiased markets (Granados, Gupta and Kauffman, 2005).
Clearly, this is a diverse and varied literature. Our work places most naturally in the third
stream, since we study how an electronic market affects outsourcing and vertical integration. How-
ever, our model and results are different from the existing literature in a number of ways. In contrast
to most earlier work, which studies the impact of IOS on individual firms or in buyer-supplier con-
texts, our work is situated at the level of the supply chain, with multiple tiers of buyers, suppliers
and intermediaries. This approach is consistent with recent work (Straub, Rai and Klein, 2004)
that highlights the need to study the impact of information technologies on the performance of
networks of firms. It also highlights the role that different transaction costs, including search and
agency costs, play in determining the vertical scope of organizations. It is well-established that
electronic markets may decrease search costs (Bakos, 1997). Moreover, Gurbaxani and Whang
(1991) point out in their influential early paper that IT lowers agency costs as well as search costs.
In a typical value chain with multiple echelons, search costs may predominate in some parts of the
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supply chain, whereas agency costs may predominate in others. By modeling the interaction of
search and agency costs, we make a unique new contribution to this literature.
Moreover, we recognize the fact that B2B search is complex, may depend on the nature of the
input, and correspondingly, the impact of IT on search costs is not single-dimensional. For exam-
ple, search for buyer-specific information involves the use of communication technologies (email,
EDI, instant messaging, faxes, phones, letters), whereas search for generic, passive information
involves the use of publication technologies (web pages, catalogs). Prior research has shown that
price information is relatively easy to convey, whereas conveying product attribute information is
more challenging (Bakos, 1997). Parsing the collection of price information, we fine-tune earlier
arguments by suggesting that in the context of B2B procurement, getting even the price of so-called
commodity goods can be anything but straightforward, if the buyer has to determine terms specific
to her case, such as delivery schedules, quantity discounts, commitment to quality levels, and so on.
Since buyer-specific terms are less likely to be published, the buyer has to engage in iterative com-
munications with suppliers. In such circumstances, hierarchies (either bilateral long-term contracts
or intra-firm governance) rather than markets may be the preferred governance mechanism. This
seems consistent with Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, (1998), who describe evidence from the
chemical industry, where electronic markets are not widespread despite chemicals being an easily
described commodity product. It is also related to early work that suggested that electronic mar-
kets will be used for products that are low in asset specificity and complexity of description, and
electronic hierarchies for products high on both dimensions (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987),
an assertion supported by the empirical results of Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, (1998), and
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994). Recent work in this direction (Granados, Gupta and Kauffman,
2005) finds that when asset specificity and product complexity are low, advanced IT facilitates the
move from electronic hierarchies toward unbiased electronic markets. We add to this literature by
studying how an electronic markets (featuring search costs) affects the choice between an electronic
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hierarchy (featuring agency costs) and an IT-mediated transaction-based relationship.
When electronic markets and IOS are widespread, intermediaries may not disappear — their roles
can simply change (Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, 1998). This suggests that intermediaries
have innate strengths, such as providing aggregation (Bhargava and Choudhary, 2004), trust, lower
operating costs, and matching services (Bailey and Bakos, 1997) that enable them to add value
despite the presence of electronic markets and other IOS. We condense these innate advantages of
intermediaries into the notion that they initially have lower search costs than the manufacturer.
This advantage could stem from intermediaries’ greater investments in, and opportunities to acquire,
domain specific knowledge, which has been shown to confer strategic advantage in technology
mediated inter-organizational relationships (Christiaanse and Venkatraman, 2002).
In addition to adding to the IS literature, our model makes a contribution to the related lit-
erature from industrial organization economics. Our approach is novel to the literature on firm
boundaries in its focus on pre-contractual transaction costs (in our context, the costs of searching
for appropriate trading partners) and their effects on the scope of firms. In contrast, most recent
theories of firm boundaries focus on post-contractual opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford and
Alchian, 1978), the benefits of ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986), and the relative viability of
relational contracts based on unverifiable outcomes (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2001, 2002).
We model vertical integration as a response to asymmetric information. Salient papers in this
literature include Arrow (1975), who models a downstream manufacturer who integrates backwards
to gain timely access to upstream input prices, Riordan and Sappington’s (1987) study of a retailer
who must decide whether to integrate backward with a manufacturer, and Lewis and Sappington
(1991), which models the impact of production technology on a firm’s decision to make or buy a
part from a low-cost supplier whose cost and effort are unobservable. We also add to the literature
on the role of middlemen, which in the past has examined competition among middlemen (Stahl,
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1988; Fingleton, 1997), their impact on the efficiency of trade (Bloch and Ryder, 1994), and their
impact on liquidity (Gehrig, 1993; Yanelle, 1989) and search costs (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987;
Yavas, 1992). Spulber (1996) reviews the economics of intermediaries in greater detail.
We do not propose a new model of search, drawing instead from the analytical framework of
Stahl (1989, 1996), since his specification most closely resembles the business scenario we analyze
(in contrast with other models of search by Stigler, 1961, Diamond, 1971, Salop and Stiglitz, 1977,
Shilony, 1977 and Varian, 1980). Finally, our model of a principal delegating costly search to a
specialized agent may have applications beyond our paper, and is the first of its kind.
2. Model
There is a single downstream manufacturer (henceforth called the buyer), who assembles and sells
a finished product (the product) at an exogenously specified price π. In order to manufacture
the product, the buyer needs a specialized part (henceforth called the part). Manufacturing the
part requires a commodity input5 (henceforth called the commodity). The commodity is supplied
by a set of m competing tier-2 suppliers. Each tier-2 supplier chooses a (potentially different)
commodity price. Due to potential price dispersion, the buyer is forced to engage in costly search,
determining each potential tier-2 supplier’s price until she discovers an acceptable price for the
commodity. To keep things simple, we think of this as a quality adjusted price, which takes into
account different delivery terms, quality differences and so on, and compares the "hedonic" prices
associated with some standardized commodity input, to facilitate comparison between suppliers,
and define a "lowest" price.
As is customary in the search literature, we assume that a small fraction μ of potential cus-
tomers for the commodity are traders (or shoppers) who have a zero search cost and so will always
5So long as the parts and commodities are independent, the model can generalize to multiple parts, each requiring
multiple commodity inputs.
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Figure 2.1: Vertical structure of industry in the model
search exhaustively for the lowest price before buying. A fraction 1 − μ of potential customers,
which include the buyer, have a have a positive search cost cP . The presence of these "shoppers"
simply ensures a smooth distribution of commodity prices in equilibrium, and they play no further
substantive role in the model. Given cP , the tier-2 suppliers’ mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
pricing strategy6 is denoted f∗(p).
The buyer decides between making the specialized part in-house (insourcing) or buying it from
the intermediary tier-1 supplier (outsourcing). If the buyer makes the part in-house, she searches
for the best-priced commodity from the tier-2 suppliers, manufactures the part, and assembles it
into the finished product. The cost of insourcing therefore comprises (i) search costs of evaluating
each potential tier-2 supplier, at the rate of cP per supplier evaluated, (ii) direct costs of buying
the commodity at price p, (iii) the cost of transforming the commodity into the part, and (iv) the
manufacturing and assembling cost, to manufacture the product from the part. To focus on search
costs associated with the procurement of the commodity, we normalize the costs of manufacturing
the specialized part and the product to zero7.
The buyer may also outsource the part from a specialist intermediary (henceforth called the
6Since the tier-2 sellers are identical, we focus on symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategies,
consistent with Stahl, 1989.
7This is equivalent to assuming that all parties have access to the same manufacturing technology for the part.
The main results of the paper are not directionally affected by assuming positive (and different) part manufacturing
costs, so long as electronic markets don’t affect these costs. Since the buyer always incurs the product manufacturing
cost, there is no loss of generality in normalizing this to zero.
10
tier-1 supplier) who, by virtue of specialization, has a lower search cost cA. The buyer can observe
the commodity price p obtained by the tier-1 supplier, but cannot observe the number of candidate
tier-2 suppliers that the tier-1 supplier samples before buying the commodity. Since the part is
specialized, and the tier-1 supplier bears idiosyncratic risk in supplying the part, we assume that
the tier-1 supplier is risk-averse, with preferences represented by the utility function u(x), where
x is the intermediary’s payoff. u(x) is twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The outside opportunity of the intermediary is denoted u ≥ 0. All parties (that is, the buyer, the
tier-1 suppliers, and the tier-2 suppliers) know u(x), u, cP , and cA.
In order to induce the tier-1 supplier to search optimally, the buyer offers the tier-1 supplier
a contract [p + w(p)], which reimburses the tier-1 supplier for the price p of the commodity, and
additionally specifies a performance-based wage w(p), where w(p) can be any function. The buyer’s
optimal contract must be designed to ensure participation from the tier-1 supplier (individual ratio-
nality), and to induce the tier-1 supplier to search optimally (incentive-compatibility). Therefore,
the buyer benefits from the tier-1 supplier’s lower search cost, but incurs hidden-action moral hazard
costs when hiring the tier-1 supplier.
The payoffs under each option are as follows. If the tier-1 supplier (the agent) searches and
obtains a commodity price p she receives a payment of [p+w∗(p)], of which she pays p to the tier-2
supplier for the commodity, and derives utility of u(w∗(p)) − (n − 1)cA, where n is the number
of searches undertaken. Consistent with the literature on search, we assume the first search to be
costless. The corresponding payoff to the buyer (the principal), who is risk-neutral, is π−[p+w∗(p)].
If, on the other hand, the buyer chooses to manufacture the part in-house, her payoff from obtaining
a commodity price p is π − [p+ (n− 1)cP ], where n is now the number of searches undertaken by
the buyer.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 2.2. To decide whether to insource or outsource,
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Figure 2.2: Sequence of events in the model
the buyer compares the ex ante payoffs of each alternative, and chooses the better option. For
simplicity, we have chosen m = 2 for the subsequent analysis. The results generalize directionally
to the case of m tier-2 suppliers, though the analysis is substantially more complex.
3. Search costs, contracting, and make versus buy
The first part of this section derives the tier-2 suppliers’ equilibrium pricing strategies, and the
buyer’s payoff from insourcing. The next part derives the optimal outsourcing contract, demon-
strating that it has a simple two-part form, and characterizes the buyer’s payoff from outsourcing.
The third part establishes that for any given buyer search cost, the buyer’s make-buy choice is
monotonic in the tier-1 supplier’s search cost. The final part examines how organizational scope
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changes when search costs vary, by comparing the relative changes in the buyer’s payoffs from
insourcing and outsourcing, for different kinds of changes in search costs.
3.1. Insourcing
We first consider the buyer’s payoff from insourcing, where the buyer procures the commodity
directly from a tier-2 supplier, makes the intermediate part, and then makes the final product.
Suppose each tier-2 supplier chooses a symmetric mixed-strategy pricing strategy f(p) with support
p ∈ [r0, p], and corresponding distribution function F (p). The following lemma, based on Stahl
(1989), establishes that the optimal search strategy for the buyer is to search until a price below a
cutoff price rP is found, or all tier-2 suppliers have been exhaustively sampled.
Lemma 1. The buyer’s optimal search strategy for the tier-2 commodity is to search until a price
less than or equal to a cutoff price rP has been obtained, or all tier-2 suppliers have been sampled,
where rP is implicitly defined by:
cP =
rPZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp (3.1)
Given Lemma 1, the equilibrium pricing strategy of the tier-2 suppliers should place zero prob-
ability on any value of p > rP , since no buyer (or trader) will purchase from a supplier whose price
is higher than rP , and placing a probability
pR
rP
f(p)dp on the price rP is a profitable deviation from
any strategy for which f(p) > 0 for p > rP . In other words, in the tier-2 suppliers’ equilibrium
strategy, p = rP .
The next lemma characterizes the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategy
of the tier-2 suppliers.
Lemma 2. The unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategy f∗(p) for all
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tier-2 is specified by the following equations:
f∗(p) =
µ
1− μ
2μ
¶
rP
p2
for p ∈ [r0, rP ] (3.2)
r0 =
∙
1− μ
1 + μ
¸
rP (3.3)
cP = rP
∙
1−
µ
1− μ
2μ
¶
log
µ
1 + μ
1− μ
¶¸
(3.4)
where F ∗(p) is the distribution function corresponding to the density f∗(p)
Given this pricing strategy, the ex-ante expected payoff to the buyer from insourcing is simply
ΠI = π −
rPZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp, (3.5)
since the first tier-2 supplier sampled by the buyer is bound to have a price below the cutoff price
rP , and the first search is costless for the buyer. Integrating (3.5) by parts and using (3.1) yields
ΠI = π − (rP − cP ). (3.6)
3.2. Outsourcing
We next consider the buyer’s payoff from outsourcing. The buyer’s problem is to design the profit-
maximizing contract p+w(p), while inducing incentive-compatible search on the part of the tier-1
supplier, and ensuring the tier-1 supplier’s participation. We continue to maintain that cP , the
search cost of the buyer, determines the equilibrium tier-2 commodity prices, and hence the pricing
strategy for these suppliers continues to be as specified by Lemma 2.
Once the contract p + w(p) is specified, the tier-1 supplier will sample tier-2 suppliers until
the expected gains from an additional search is less than the expected increase in expected utility.
Therefore, given any contract in which w(p) is non-increasing in p, there will be a cutoff price at
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which the tier-1 supplier stops searching. We formulate the buyer’s problem for each such arbitrary
cutoff price rA that the buyer may wish to induce the tier-1 supplier to stop searching at (we will
subsequently choose the optimal rA). Denote this contract for an arbitrary rA as p + w(p, rA).
Given any such rA, the buyer must design w(p, rA) so that rA is indeed the cutoff price at which
the tier-1 supplier stops searching, which leads to the following incentive-compatibility constraint:
[IC] :
rAZ
r0
[u(w(p, rA))− u(w(rA, rA))]f∗(p)dp ≥ cA. (3.7)
The contract must also ensure the tier-1 supplier’s participation. The formulation of this participa-
tion constraint, and of the buyer’s objective function are constructed by assigning the appropriate
probability to each possible outcome for a cutoff price of rA — the details of this are available in
Appendix B. Summing up, the buyer’s contract design problem reduces to:
max
w(.,rA)
π −
⎛
⎝[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)[p+ w(p, rA)]dp+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)][p+ w(p, rA)]dp
⎞
⎠
subject to :
[IC] :
rAZ
r0
[u(w(p, rA))− u(w(rA, rA))]f∗(p)dp ≥ cA (3.8)
[IR] :
[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)u(w(p, rA))dp
+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)]u(w(p, rA))dp− cA[1− F ∗(rA)] ≥ u
(3.9)
Solving the buyer’s problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The optimal bilateral contract p+w∗(p, rA) that induces a cutoff price of rA has
15
pPrAr
( )H Aw r
( )L Aw r
Figure 3.1: Performance-based portion of bilateral contract between buyer and tier-1 supplier.
the following simple structure:
w∗(p, rA) = u−1(u+ cA
1− F ∗(rA)
F ∗(rA)
) for p ≤ rA (3.10)
w∗(p, rA) = u−1(u− cA) for p > rA
Therefore, the buyer pays the tier-1 supplier the commodity price and (a) a constant higher wage
wH(rA) = u−1(u + cA
1−F∗(rA)
F∗(rA)
) if the tier-1 supplier obtains a commodity price p ≤ rA and (b) a
constant lower wage wL(rA) = u−1(u− cA) if the tier-1 supplier obtains a commodity price p > rA.
The structure of the contract derived in Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Despite
the fact that the outcome set (price of the commodity obtained) is continuous, the nature of the
agent’s task (search) naturally lends itself to a partition of this space into favorable and unfavor-
able outcomes. This is because even when the payoffs are continuous and directly to the party
searching (as is the case in the first-best), the decision rule for whether to search again is based
on a deterministic cutoff price. Proposition 1 shows that this induces the principal (the buyer) to
structure a contract that explicitly makes the payoff from the task of the agent (the tier-1 supplier)
discrete. Additionally, the tier-1 supplier can take one of two (or in general, one of m) discrete
actions (search once, twice), rather than having a continuous action space (as is the case in moral
hazard models in which the agent chooses effort). This provides some intuition for why the optimal
contract is discontinuous and flat, rather than varying smoothly with observed outcome p.
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Figure 3.2: Illustrates the profits from outsourcing and insourcing respectively, and how they vary
with the buyer’s choice of rA (the cutoff price which the tier-1 supplier is induced to stop searching
at by the bilateral contract), for two candidate sets of parameter values. The figure below the
profit curve illustrates that at the optimal value rA = r∗A, the expected value of an additional
search by the agent exactly balances the expected cost to the buyer (principal) of inducing this
search. However, since r∗A is strictly higher than the agent’s first-best search strategy, the contract
results in an effective increase in the magnitude of agent’s search cost. In (a), which illustrates a
lower value of cA, outsourcing is more profitable. In (b), which illustrates a higher value of cA, even
the best choice of rA yields lower profits than those from insourcing, and so the buyer chooses to
manufacture the intermediate part in-house.
The buyer choosing the value of rA that maximizes profits, given that their optimal contract for
a fixed rA is as specified by Proposition 1. Rearranging the buyer’s objective function, this optimal
cutoff price r∗A solves:
r∗A = arg min
rA∈[r0,rP ]
[2− F ∗(rA)]F ∗(rA)wH(rA) + [1− F ∗(rA)]2wL(rA) (3.11)
+[2− F ∗(rA)]
rAZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp+ 2
rPZ
rA
pf∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)]dp
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and the buyer’s payoff from outsourcing is therefore
ΠO = π − [[2− F ∗(r∗A)]F ∗(r∗A)wH(r∗A) + [1− F ∗(r∗A)]2wL(r∗A) (3.12)
+[2− F ∗(r∗A)]
r∗AZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp+ 2
rPZ
r∗A
pf∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)]dp].
3.3. Relative search costs and organizational scope
We now characterize the buyer’s decision between outsourcing and insourcing. Clearly, the buyer
chooses to outsource (insource) if ΠO > ΠI (ΠO < ΠI). Comparing (3.5) and (3.12) and rearrang-
ing, outsourcing is optimal if the following condition is satisfied:
[2−F ∗(r∗A)]F ∗(r∗A)wH(r∗A)+[1−F ∗(r∗A)]2wL(r∗A) ≤
rPZ
r∗A
pf∗(p)[2F ∗(p)−1]dp−[1−F ∗(r∗A)]
r∗AZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp.
(3.13)
The intuition behind this expression is straightforward. Given the optimal bilateral contract, the
LHS of (3.13) is the expected payment to the tier-1 supplier; [2 − F ∗(r∗A)]F ∗(r∗A) is the ex-ante
probability of the favorable outcome, and [1−F ∗(r∗A)]2 is the ex-ante probability of the unfavorable
outcome. The RHS of (3.13) is the expected reduction in commodity prices as a consequence of
the tier-1 supplier’s superior search. Clearly, when the latter is greater than the former, the buyer
prefers to outsource. Correspondingly, when the LHS of (3.13) is greater than the RHS of (3.13),
the buyer prefers to insource.
The next proposition shows that this decision is monotonic in the tier-1 supplier’s search cost
cA in the following sense — there is generally a continuous lower range of value of cA over which the
buyer outsources, and a continuous higher range of values of cA over which the buyer insources.
Proposition 2. For any buyer search cost cP > 0:
(a) If cA = cP , then the firm always prefers insourcing to outsourcing
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Figure 3.3: Illustrates the result of of Proposition 2, by depicting the regions in which the buyer
chooses to outsource, and those regions in which the buyer chooses to insource.
(b) The buyer’s profits from outsourcing decrease monotonically with cA.
Therefore, if there exists a threshold value c ∈ (0, cP ) at which the buyer is indifferent between
outsourcing and insourcing, the buyer outsources when cA < c, and the buyer insources when
cA > c.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the result from Proposition 2. At each high enough value of cP , there is a
corresponding value c of cA at which the buyer is indifferent between outsourcing and insourcing.
At each fixed value of cP , the buyer outsources for cA < c, and insources for cA > c. The graph
of c as a function of cP is increasing and convex, and its slope is bounded above by 1. It also lies
entirely below the 45o line, as demonstrated by part (a) of the proposition.
Given cP , the existence of the threshold value c depends on whether the buyer ever chooses
to outsource. If outsourcing is preferable when the tier-1 supplier has zero search costs (that is,
for cA = 0), then an immediate corollary of (a) and (b) in Proposition 2 is that there is a positive
threshold value c ∈ (0, cP ). On the other hand, if the tier-1 supplier’s reservation utility is high
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enough, or the buyer’s search cost low enough, to make insourcing optimal even when cA = 0, the
buyer will choose to manufacture the intermediate part in-house for all cA > 0.
4. How electronic market technologies affect the extended enterprise
As we have discussed, an electronic market may change search costs for different firms across
different tiers of the value chain to varying degrees. In this section, we first characterize how the
organizational scope of an extended enterprise built around such an electronic market varies as there
are differential changes in search costs across the manufacturer (buyer) and the tier-1 intermediary.
We then describe the nature of B2B search in some detail, link its characteristics to technologies
that affect information intensive and communication-intensive search, and, integrating the nature
of search with our analytical results, contrast the changes in the scope of the enterprise that the
electronic market is thereby likely to induce.
4.1. Changes in organizational scope as search costs vary
In order to characterize directional changes in organizational scope in a general way, and only
in contexts of interest, we do the following. We assume that under the status-quo (prior to the
adoption of the electronic market), the buyer is indifferent between outsourcing and insourcing. This
is equivalent to assuming that cA is at the threshold level c corresponding to cP , as described in
Proposition 2. We then vary the search costs cA and cP in a systematic way, and establish whether
the changes in search costs cause the buyer to insource or outsource. If the buyer insources as
a consequence of the changes described, we conclude that search costs changes of that kind are
likely to increase the organizational scope of an enterprise built around the electronic market.
Correspondingly, if the buyer outsources as a consequence of the changes in the search costs, we
conclude that search costs changes of that kind are likely to decrease organizational scope, and lead
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Figure 4.1: Illustrates the results of Propositions 3, 4 and 5. Starting at any indifferent point
A, when the electronic market causes search costs to converge to a common value B, the buyer
prefers to insource. Any proportionate reduction in costs (along the dotted line joining A to the
origin) results in an indifferent buyer choosing to insource, confirming Proposition 4. In contrast,
a constant bilateral reduction in search costs, to point D results in an indifferent buyer opting to
outsource, as shown by Proposition 5.
to a more loosely coupled enterprise.
The first result, which follows directly from Proposition 2(a), establishes that if the electronic
market causes search costs converge to a common value, this leads to a decrease in organizational
scope.
Proposition 3. An electronic market that causes the search costs of both the buyer and the tier-1
supplier to converge to a common value results in higher organizational scope.
Sometimes, a precursor (or parallel activity) to the adoption of an electronic market may be
the implementation of a common technology platform that spans many business processes, the
associated re-engineering of these processes (Sanders, 2001), and the adoption of best practice
shared processes for functions like procurement across firms in the marketplace. If a tier-1 supplier’s
search cost advantage is embedded in a superior procurement process, this kind of re-engineering
21
could potentially result in the convergence of the buyer and tier-1 supplier’s search costs, and lead
to an increase in the scope of the buyer firm.
Next, we examine the effects of a proportionate reduction in both cP and cA:
Proposition 4. An electronic market that causes the search costs of both the buyer and tier-1
supplier to reduce by the same constant proportion k < 1 — that is, from their original values cP , cA
to new values kcP , kcA — results in higher organizational scope.
Intuitively, the result in Proposition 4 is driven by the invariance of the tier-1 supplier’s outside
alternatives, and the corresponding increased importance of the tier-1 supplier’s outside opportu-
nity when search costs decrease across the industry. This is the result underlying our subsequent
discussion of communication-intensive search.
Finally, we establish the effects of a constant reduction in both cP and cA:
Proposition 5. An electronic market that causes the search costs of both the buyer and tier-1
supplier to reduce by the same constant amount τ — that is, from their original values cP , cA to
new values (cP − τ), (cA − τ) — results in lower organizational scope
Some intuition for this proposition can be obtained by considering an extreme case, when τ = cA.
This represents a reduction in search costs that takes the tier-1 supplier’s search costs to zero. Since
cP > cA, the buyer still has a positive search cost after the reduction, and consequently, finds it
profitable to outsource. This is the result underlying our subsequent discussion of communication-
intensive search.
The results of Propositions 3 through 5 are illustrated in Figure 4.1. Consider a buyer at the
indifferent point A prior to the adoption of the electronic market. When the search costs of both
the buyer and tier-1 supplier converge, to any point B on the 45o line, the buyer then chooses to
insource. When they reduce proportionately (along the line joining A to the origin) to point C, the
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Nature of product Raw materials, processed materials, generic parts, 
specialized parts, capital equipment, MRO (maintenance, 
repair and operations), business services.
Procurement situation New task, modified rebuy, straight rebuy.
Recognition of need, specification determination and 
description, search for qualified suppliers, RFP, proposal 
analysis and evaluation, supplier selection, order routine 
specification, performance feedback and evaluation
Steps in the process
Figure 4.2: Classifies B2B procurement based on the nature of the product and buying situation;
also summarizes the steps in the B2B buying process.
buyer chooses to insource. In contrast, when they each reduce by a constant factor τ to the point
D, the buyer chooses to outsource.
4.2. The nature of B2B search
The prior subsection has characterized directional changes in the scope of the enterprise for different
kinds of changes in search costs. While search costs tend to be reduced by electronic markets, it
seems important to explore the connection between the nature of search in business-to-business
transactions, and the corresponding extent of change in search costs, since, unlike consumer search,
B2B search is quite involved, and requires substantial organizational resources.
Figure 4.2 summarizes a classification of the nature of B2B buying, based on Kotler (2002)
and Robinson, Faris and Wind (1967). The types of products/situations that are generally con-
sidered search-intensive are highlighted, as are the steps in the process that are most likely to
contribute to search costs. During this search process, buyers often must evaluate multiple ven-
dor and product characteristics. This process often requires information acquisition from multiple
sources. Dempsey (1978) identifies and classifies these attributes into five factors: basic economic
criteria (price, quality, delivery), attendant services (repair, packaging), geographic affinity (loca-
tion), assurance mechanisms (production facilities, delivery capability, control systems), and vendor
stability (labor relations, management and organization).In addition, buyers must often engage in
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Figure 4.3: Illustrates how electronic marketplaces change organizational scope when search is
information-intensive.
active and iterative communication with their suppliers, and within their organization, to facil-
itate effective collaborative decision making by a number of different participants in the buying
organization8.
Highlighting these two dimensions of search is important, as our next two sections illustrate.
4.3. Information-intensive search
In general, information sources are classified as either personal or non-personal, and as commercial
or non-commercial. Personal information sources are capable of providing specialized information
directly addressing a specific buyer’s concerns, whereas impersonal information sources provide
general information that all potential buyers are likely to find useful. Commercial information
8For example, Webster and Wind (1972) classify participants in the industrial procurement process into the roles of
users, buyers, deciders, gatekeepers and influencers. Users affect the buying decision positively by specifying product
requirements, or negatively by refusing to work with certain materials. Buyers have the formal authority to arrange
for the procurement, and tend to be purchasing managers. Deciders tend to be senior managers who approve the
buying decision. Gatekeepers control the flow of information to other participants in the buying decision. Influencers
could be distinct from any of the above, and exert direct or indirect influence on the buying decision.
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sources are those that the seller provides — examples of personal commercial sources are salespeople
and trade shows; of personal non-commercial sources are internal departments, outside consultants
and colleagues; of impersonal commercial sources are trade-publication ads, sales literature and
catalogs, and of impersonal non-commercial sources are trade press articles and rating services9.
We term the search information-intensive if it involves the acquisition and processing of a
substantial amount of non-personal information. Many marketplace technologies substantially lower
the cost of acquiring and evaluating this kind of information. Examples include online product
catalogs, Internet-based supplier portals, and product/price comparison engines.
When marketplace participants gain access to these information systems, their search costs
are therefore likely to reduce by a constant amount. This kind of constant reduction in search
costs is especially likely in straight-rebuy situations, since it requires the evaluation of relatively
few vendor and product attributes, using impersonal sources of information, and involves fewer
decision makers. However, it is highly unlikely that search costs will reduce to zero, since there are
still costly evaluation steps involved for each candidate supplier This kind of change in search costs
is illustrated in Figure 4.3, and as demonstrated by Proposition 5, our model predicts that it tends
to lead to a reduction in organizational scope.
4.4. Communication-intensive search
Often, one thinks of search as being a simple process of information acquisition. However, our
analysis of the industrial procurement process above has revealed that inter-entity (person, depart-
ment, firm) communication is always a critical part of the process, and often an important cost
driver. Acquiring information often involves communication — with personal commercial sources
like salespeople and trade shows personnel, and with personal non-commercial sources like outside
9This is based on Moriarty and Spekman (1984). In their listing of perceived importance of fourteen information
sources, six of the top seven are personal sources.
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Figure 4.4: Illustrates how electronic marketplaces change organizational scope when search is
communication-intensive.
consultants and colleagues. Additionally, several departments10 within the buyer firm are involved
in the evaluation of each supplier proposal, with significant iterative communication during the
process. Participants in the buying firm don’t necessarily consult the same non-personal infor-
mation sources, and are therefore likely to have different opinions that are reconciled by iterative
communication before making the buying decision. This is especially true in new task and modified
re-buy situations, which require the evaluation of multiple vendor and product attributes.
The interorganizational systems in electronic markets reduce this cost of iterative communi-
cation significantly. For example, Covisint’s Connect platform moves beyond EDI to provide it’s
marketplace participants with sophisticated any-to-any translation capability that can handle both
EDI and XML technologies in one environment; their Communicate platform also serves as the
framework for OEM-to-supplier and supplier-to-supplier communications. These information sys-
tems make each iteration of communication less expensive, faster, less error-prone, and richer. This
10For instance, Jackson, Keith and Burdick (1984) show that personnel from purchasing, manufacturing, engineer-
ing, top management and other departments influence the process to varying degrees.
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may decreases the number of iterations required, probably by some fixed fraction, and also de-
creases the cost of each iteration, and therefore results in a proportionate decrease in search costs
across firms. Recall that we had characterized differences in search costs between manufacturers
and intermediaries as stemming from the number of communication iterations before the final terms
are established, and prior expertise that makes this determination effective. This kind of change in
search costs is illustrated in Figure 4.4, and as demonstrated by Proposition 4, our model predicts
that it will tend to lead to an increase in organizational scope.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Given that the IT infrastructure of Internet-based B2B electronic markets facilitates the interaction
of a firm with a broader array of trading partners, and lowers the cost of transacting with them, it
is therefore natural to conclude that these electronic markets will reduce the size of organizations.
Before coming to this conclusion, however, it is important to notice that the industries in which such
markets are situated have complex and multi-tier supply chains, and a number of intermediaries
owe their existence to their transaction cost and expertise advantages. Thus, the same changes
that facilitate ease of transaction between firms across the supply chain may also cause these
intermediaries to lose the advantages that lead to their activities being located outside the scope
of the traditional downstream enterprise. In other words, they could well be disintermediated, and
firms scope may increase, an outcome that is further favored by the lowering of moral hazard and
incomplete contracting costs that accompany the move to a more vertically integrated enterprise.
Our paper has studied this trade-off, by integrating search theory, which models how changes
in search costs caused by the marketplace systems affect input price distributions, with the hidden
action principal-agent model, which forms the basis for analyzing the costs of bilateral contracting
between an intermediary and a downstream manufacturer. Our results show that the resulting
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changes in enterprise scope and integration depend critically on the nature of search and the
corresponding capabilities of the technologies associated with the electronic market.
Often, electronic marketplaces combine technologies that reduce the cost of acquiring published
information with those that facilitate faster and less costly communication. In light of our results
contrasting information intensive and communication intensive search, these have opposing effects
on the desirability of vertical integration, and the resulting changes in organizational scope will thus
depend on the relative information-intensity and communication-intensity of search. Returning to
our introductory example, for MRO and indirect materials with well-specified characteristics, and a
lower dependence on the firms’ product design and other supplier relationships, search tends to be
more information-intensive, whereas for direct materials, search tends to be more communication-
intensive, and the relative pace at which PSP’s have been adopted for each of these categories is
therefore consistent with our model’s predictions.
Our model predicts certain simple conditions under which industry-wide electronic business-to-
business markets are likely to increase or decrease the vertical scope of the extended enterprise over
time. A natural direction for future research would be towards confirming this direction of change
empirically. This would involve a structured analysis and collection of data relating to the effects
of marketplace technologies on search costs, and while our model provides the necessary theoretical
basis and testable predictions for a first study, such data is likely to have immense value in studying
other questions of importance to IS research as well.
There are several other contexts featuring both costly search, contracting under asymmetric
information, and the delegation of costly search to an intermediary. Our model provides a first
explanation for why these contracts are often "all or nothing." Our context is therefore part of a
larger class of problems that investigate how differing search costs, and correspondingly, different
search behavior across agents can affect the decision-making process of each of these agents (Rein-
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ganum, 1982). It would be interesting to extend the model developed in our paper to inform this
question further. In some industries, downstream buyers may not be aware of their intermediate
tier-1 supplier’s search cost. A procurement contract between the buyer and tier-1 supplier would
then be characterized by adverse selection as well as moral hazard (a somewhat related problem
is addressed by Dai and Lewis, 2003). Another direction involves examining how the technological
infrastructure associated with a B2B market changes the feasibility of implementing market-like re-
lationships within the firm, since recent research (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2001) has indicated
that many market-like transactions cannot be replicated within a firm — this is especially relevant
when dealing with procurement.
To summarize, we have studied how electronic business-to-business markets affect the vertical
scope and integration of the extended enterprise, and the desirability of outsourcing. We charac-
terize B2B search as being more complex than consumer search, and model three key effects that
declining search costs induce: a change in the transaction costs of all firms; a change in the contract-
ing costs associated with outsourcing, and a change in the price dispersion of input commodities.
Integrating the nature of B2B search with the details of the IT in an electronic market, our model
predicts that when search is information-intensive, electronic markets will facilitate an increase in
outsourcing and a reduction in organizational scope, whereas when it is primarily communication-
intensive, electronic markets will lead to an increase in organizational scope. There are a variety
of industries in which both technological and agency issues will influence the eventual success of
global IT-facilitated extended enterprise initiatives, and we hope that our work will provide useful
guidelines for companies who face increasingly challenging organizational design and governance
decisions in these industries.
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7. Appendix A: Proofs
Proof. of Lemma 1: (Based on Stahl, 1989) Suppose each tier-2 supplier plays the same mixed
strategy f(p). Given an observed price z, a buyer with search cost cP will search again only if the
benefit from additional search ∆(z) is greater than cP , where the benefit from additional search
given z is:
∆(z) = z −
⎡
⎣
zZ
r0
pf(p)dp+
pZ
z
zf(p)dp
⎤
⎦ , (7.1)
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which can be rewritten as
∆(z) = z −
⎡
⎣
zZ
r0
p
dF (p)
dp
dp+ z(1− F (z))
⎤
⎦ =
zZ
r0
F (p)dp. (7.2)
The buyer optimal cutoff price rP equates the benefit from additional search to the search cost cP ,
and therefore solves
∆(rP ) = cP . (7.3)
SinceF (p) > 0 for p > r0, ∆(z) is strictly increasing in z, and therefore (7.3) has a unique solution,
and the result follows.
Proof. of Lemma 2: (Based on Stahl, 1989) Consider a candidate tier-2 supplier who faces
the mixed strategy f(p) from its opponent. The profits from a choice of price p to this supplier can
be reduced to
π(p) =
µ
μ [1− F (p)] + 1− μ
2
¶
p. (7.4)
Substituting p = rP into (7.4) yields
π(rP ) =
1− μ
2
rP . (7.5)
The tier-2 supplier must make the same expected profit from each price in the support of their
mixed strategy p ∈ [r0, rP ] . Substituting (7.5) into (7.4) yieldsµ
μ [1− F ∗(p)] + 1− μ
2
¶
p =
1− μ
2
rP , (7.6)
which yields
F ∗(p) = 1−
µ
1− μ
2μ
¶µ
rP
p
− 1
¶
, (7.7)
and therefore,
f∗(p) =
dF ∗(p)
dp
=
µ
1− μ
2μ
¶
rP
p2
. (7.8)
Using the fact that F (r0) = 0 in (7.7) yields
r0 =
∙
1− μ
1 + μ
¸
rP (7.9)
From equation 3.1 we have cP =
rPR
r0
F ∗(p)dp. Substituting F ∗(p) = 1 −
³
1−μ
2μ
´³
rP
p − 1
´
from
equation 7.7, we have
cP = rP
∙
1−
µ
1− μ
2μ
¶
log
µ
1 + μ
1− μ
¶¸
(7.10)
, which completes the proof.
Proof. of Proposition 1: Given a fixed rA, since π is fixed, the buyer’s problem is equivalent
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to:
min
w(.,rA)
⎛
⎝[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)[p+ w(p, rA)]dp+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)][p+ w(p, rA)]dp
⎞
⎠(7.11)
subject to :
[IR] :
[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)u(w(p, rA))dp
+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p))[1− F ∗(p)]u(w(p, rA))dp− cA[1− F ∗(rA)] ≥ u
(7.12)
[IC] :
rAZ
r0
[u(w(p))− u(w(p, rA))].f∗(p)dp ≥ cA (7.13)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L(λ1, λ2, w(., rA)) =
⎛
⎝[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)[p+ w(p, rA)]dp+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)][p+ w(p, rA)]dp
⎞
⎠
+λ1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)u(w(p, rA))dp
+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p))[1− F ∗(p)]u(w(p, rA))dp− cA[1− F ∗(rA)]− u
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(7.14)
+λ2
⎛
⎝
rAZ
r0
[u(w(p))− u(w(p, rA))].f∗(p)dp− cA
⎞
⎠
Optimizing pointwise for w(., rA) in the intervals [r0, rA] and [rA, rP ] respectively yields first-order
conditions that simplify to:
∂L
∂w
= 0 :
1
u1(w(p))
= λ1 +
λ2
2− F (rA)
for p ∈ [r0, rA] (7.15)
and
∂L
∂w
= 0 :
1
u1(w(p))
= λ1for p ∈ [rA, rP ] (7.16)
Therefore, w(p) is a constant value wH(rA) in [r0, rA], and a different constant value wL(rA) in
[rA, rP ]. Since u11(x) < 0, it follows that wH(rA) > wL(rA). Using the first-order conditions
∂L
∂λ1 = 0 and
∂L
∂λ2 = 0 (that is, using the fact that the conditions IC and IR will bind), and
simplifying yields the functional forms for wH(rA) and wL(rA).
Proof. of Proposition 2: (a) Assume the converse — that is, when cA = cP , the cost
of outsourcing is less than the cost of insourcing. Suppose now that the buyer insources and
uses exactly the same search strategy as prescribed to the tier-1 supplier by the optimal bilateral
contract (a cutoff of r∗A ). This would lead to exactly the same ex-ante expected search costs (since
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cA = cP ), and the same ex-ante expected commodity price (since the search strategy is identical).
This would also lead to costs that were weakly higher than the buyer’s optimal insourcing search
strategy. The fact that the cost of outsourcing is less than the costs of this optimal insourcing
strategy imply that ex-ante expected wages are negative, which contradicts the fact that u > 0.
(b) The buyer chooses the stopping rule rA that maximizes the objective function:
Π(rA) = π − {[2− F ∗(rA)]F ∗(rA)wH(rA) + [1− F ∗(rA)]2wL(rA) (7.17)
+[2− F ∗(rA)]
rAZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp+ 2
rPZ
rA
pf∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)]dp}.
Simplifying dΠ(rA)drA = 0 yields the following first-order necessary condition for this problem:
2f∗(r∗A)[1− F ∗(r∗A)][wH(r∗A)− wL(r∗A)] + f∗(r∗A)
⎛
⎜⎝r∗AF (r∗A)−
r∗AZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp
⎞
⎟⎠ (7.18)
= −F ∗(r∗A)[2− F ∗(r∗A)]wH1 (r∗A). (7.19)
Now, from Proposition 1, we know that:
u(wH(r∗A)) = u+ cA
1− F ∗(r∗A)
F ∗(r∗A)
. (7.20)
Differentiating both sides of (7.20) with respect to rA and rearranging yields:
wH1 (r
∗
A) = −
cAf∗(r∗A)
[u1(wH(r∗A))][F ∗(r
∗
A)]
2
. (7.21)
Also, integration by parts yields the identity:
r∗AF (r
∗
A)−
r∗AZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp =
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp. (7.22)
Furthermore, the optimal choice cutoff r∗A should be such that having found a price r
∗
A, the expected
reduction in commodity price from a second search by the agent must exactly balance the increase
in wages that this search entails, or
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp =
⎛
⎜⎝
r∗AZ
r0
wH(r∗A)f
∗(p)dp+
rPZ
r∗A
wL(r∗A)f
∗(p)dp
⎞
⎟⎠−wL(r∗A), (7.23)
which implies that:
[wH(r∗A)− wL(r∗A)] =
1
[F (r∗A)]
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp. (7.24)
Substituting the expressions for wH1 (r
∗
A) from (7.20), r
∗
AF (r
∗
A) −
r∗AZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp from (7.22) and
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[wH(r∗A) − wL(r∗A)] from (7.24) into (7.18) and rearranging terms yields the simplified first-order
condition:
[2− F ∗(r∗A)]
[F (r∗A)]
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp =
[2− F ∗(r∗A)]
[F (r∗A)]
cA
u1(wH(r∗A))
, (7.25)
which in turn implies that
cA = u1(wH(r∗A))
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp. (7.26)
Differentiating both sides of (7.26) with respect to cA and rearranging yields:
dr∗A
dcA
=
1
u11(wH(r∗A))w
H
1 ((r
∗
A)
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp+ u1(wH(r∗A))F ∗(rA)
. (7.27)
Since u1(x) > 0, u11(x) < 0, and wH1 (rA) < 0 from (7.21), the RHS of (7.27) is strictly positive,
and therefore, dr
∗
A
dcA
> 0.
Now, using (7.24) and (3.1), and regrouping terms in the integrals, (7.17) reduces to:
K(r∗A) = rP −
rPZ
r∗A
¡
2F ∗(p)− [F (p)]2
¢
dp+ wL(r∗A), (7.28)
and it is straightforward to verify that K(rA) is strictly increasing in r∗A. Since
dr∗A
dcA
> 0, the result
follows.
Proof. of Proposition 3: This follows directly from Proposition 2(a).
The proof of Proposition 4 uses the following lemma, which is proved in the extended appendix.
Lemma 3. Denote the set of values (cP , cA) for which the buyer is indifferent between outsourcing
and insourcing. If one expresses this locus a a function cA of cP , then this function is strictly
convex, or
d2cA
dc2P
> 0
Proof. of Proposition 4: Lemma 3 implies that a straight line from the origin to (cA, cP )on
the locus intersects the locus at exactly one point, this one, and since the locus is convex, the result
follows.
Proof. of Proposition 5: Assume the converse. Therefore, there exists τ > 0 such that
(c∗P , c
∗
A) lies on the locus, while (c
∗
P − τ , c∗A − τ) lies above the locus. This implies that
dcA
dcP
> 1
at (c∗P , c
∗
A), and from Lemma 3, this implies that
dcA
dcP
> 1 for each cP > c∗P , which in turn means
that at some point, cP = cA on the locus, contradicting Proposition 2(a). The result follows.
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8. Appendix B: Extended Appendix
Formulating the buyer’s contracting problem
Let the first price observed by the tier-1 supplier be p1. If she decides to search again the second
price observed is p2. The final price chosen is min[p1, p2]. When the tier-1 supplier searches once,
she could encounter either of the two tier-2 suppliers with equal likelihood. In either case, the
tier-2 supplier could have a price p1 < rA with probability F (rA), in which case the tier-1 supplier
stops searching. Or the tier-2 supplier could have a price p1 > rA with a probability [1− F (rA)],
in which case the tier-1 supplier must sample the second tier-2 supplier, and incur a search cost cA.
Now the second tier-2 supplier could offer a price p2 < rA, in which case the tier-1 supplier chooses
her offer. Or the second tier-2 supplier could offer a price p2 > rA, in which case the tier-1 supplier
selects min[p1, p2]. These possible outcomes are summarized in Figure B.1.
Under outcome (A) the ex-ante expected payment from the tier-1 supplier to the tier-2 supplier is
rAZ
r0
pf∗(p)dp. Therefore the expected payment from the buyer to the tier-1 supplier is 12
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)[p+
w(p)]dp. Similarly, the buyer’s expected payment to the tier-1 supplier under outcome (B) is 12 [1−
F ∗(rA; cP )]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)[p+w(p)]dp and under outcome (C) or (D) is 12
rPZ
rA
f∗(p)[1−F ∗(rA)][p+w(p)]dp.
The expected costs of outcomes (C) and (D) are identical. There are corresponding outcomes (E)
through (H) on the other side of the tree (indicated by dotted lines). Summing over each of these
eight outcomes yields the expected cost
[2− F ∗(rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)[p+ w(p)]dp+ 2
rPZ
rA
f∗(p)[1− F ∗(p)][p+ w(p)]dp,
which when subtracted from the price π yields the buyer’s objective function. Correspondingly,
under each outcome of figure B.1, the tier-1 supplier receives a wage w(p) which yields utility
u(w(p)). Calculating expected value over each outcome, and taking into account that a search
cost of zero is incurred in outcome (A) because the first search is costless, and a search cost cA in
outcomes (B), (C) and (D), yields the tier-1 supplier’s expected payoff:
[2− F (rA)]
rAZ
r0
f∗(p)u(w(p))dp+
rPZ
rA
2f∗(p))[1− F ∗(p)]u(w(p))dp− cA[1− F ∗(rA)],
which must be greater than or equal to the tier-1 supplier’s reservation utility u.
Proof. of Lemma 3: From (7.28), the locus of all values (cP , cA) such that the buyer is
i
Figure 8.1: Partial tree of outcomes when the tier-1 supplier searches.
indifferent between making the part in-house and outsourcing it, is given by the equation:
rP − cP = rP −
rPZ
r∗A
¡
2F ∗(p)− [F (p)]2
¢
dp+ wL(r∗A) (8.1)
or by
cP =
rPZ
r∗A
¡
2F ∗(p)− [F (p)]2
¢
dp− wL(r∗A) (8.2)
The slope of the locus is simply
dcA
dcP
= −∂G/∂cP
∂G/∂cA
(8.3)
where
G ≡ cP −
rPZ
r∗A
¡
2F ∗(p)− [F (p)]2
¢
dp+ wL(r∗A) (8.4)
In what follows, we denote ∂G∂cP = GcP ,
∂G
∂cA
= GcA ,
∂2G
∂c2P
= Gcp,cp ,
∂2G
∂c2A
= GcA,cA ,
∂2G
∂cA∂cP
=
GcA,cP .First, we show that −cP > 0G. Differentiating both sides of (8.4) with respect to cP and
using (3.10) and (3.4) to simplify yields:,
−GcP = −1 +
1
μ
− (1− μ)
2
2μ3
(
rP
rA
− 1− log rP
rA
) (8.5)
It can be verified that the expression (rPrA − 1− log
rP
rA
) is increasing in rPrA − 1. Since
³
rP
rA
− 1
´
MAX
ii
=
³
rP
rA
− 1
´
rA=r0
= rPr0 − 1 =
1+μ
1−μ − 1 =
2μ
1−μ , we have (
rP
rA
− 1− log rPrA )MAX =
2μ
1−μ − log(
1+μ
1−μ) =
2μ
1−μ − (2μ +
2
3μ
3 + 25μ
5 + ...) ' 2μ21−μ − (23μ3 + 25μ5 + ...), and so − ∂G∂cP = −1 + 1μ −
(1−μ)2
2μ3 (
2μ2
1−μ −
(23μ
3 + 25μ
5 + ...)) = −1 + 1μ −
1−μ
μ +
2
3μ
3 + 25μ
5 + ... = 23μ
3 + 25μ
5 + ... > 0.
Next, we show that GcA > 0, as follows:
∂G
∂cA
= −
∂(
rPZ
r∗A
¡
2F ∗(p)− [F (p)]2
¢
dp)
∂cA
− ∂(u
−1(u− cA))
∂cA
=
∂r∗A
∂cA
(2F (r∗A)− (F (r∗A))2) +
1
uL1
,
where uL = u(wL(r∗A)), i.e. wages paid when outcome is a higher-than-optimal-cutoff (r
∗
A) price for
the raw material, and the subscript of uL1 refers to the first derivative. Now,
∂r∗A
∂cA
= −∂H/∂cA∂H/∂r∗A
,
where H ≡ (wH − wL)F (r∗A) −
R r∗a
r0
F (p)dp, the condition for optimal r∗A from equation 7.24.
∂H
∂cA
= F (r∗A)
³
1−F (r∗A)
F (r∗A)
1
uH1
+ 1uL1
´
, where uH = u(wH(r∗A)), i.e. the wages paid when outcome is
a lower-than-optimal-cutoff (r∗A) price for the raw material, and the subscript of u
L
1 refers to the
first derivative. ∂H∂r∗A
= 1uH1
³
−cAf(r∗A)
(F (r∗A))
2
´
F (r∗A) + (w
H −wL)f(r∗A)− F (r∗A). Since (wH −wL)F (r∗A) =
R r∗a
r0
F (p)dp (from equation 7.24) and cA = u1(wH(r∗A))
r∗AZ
r0
F ∗(p)dp (from equation 7.26), we have
∂H
∂r∗A
= −F (r∗A), and
∂r∗A
∂cA
=
−∂H/∂cA
∂H/∂r∗A
=
1− F (r∗A)
F (r∗A)
1
uH1
+
1
uL1
(8.6)
and ∂G∂cA =
∂r∗A
∂cA
(2F (r∗A)− (F (r∗A))2) + 1uL1 = (
1−F (r∗A)
F (r∗A)
1
uH1
+ 1uL1
)(2F (r∗A)− (F (r∗A))2) + 1uL1 . Since
1
uH1
= λ1 + λ22−F (rA) (from equation 7.15) and
1
uL1
= λ1 (from equation 7.16), we have
GcA = (1− F (r∗A))(λ1 + λ2) (8.7)
Therefore,
dcA
dcP
= −GcP
GcA
=
−1 + 1μ −
(1−μ)2
2μ3 (
rP
rA
− 1− log rPrA )
(1− F (r∗A))(λ1 + λ2)
(8.8)
Denoting ∂G∂cP = GcP ,
∂G
∂cA
= GcA ,
∂2G
∂c2P
= Gcp,cp ,
∂2G
∂c2A
= GcA,cA ,
∂2G
∂cA∂cP
= GcA,cP , we have
d2cA
dc2P
=
2GcPGcAcP −GcAGcP ,cP − (GcP )2
³
GcA,cA
GcA
´
G2cA
(8.9)
GcP cP =
∂GcP
∂cP
=
∂(1− 1μ+
(1−μ)2
2μ3
(
rP
rA
−1−log rPrA ))
∂cP
= (1−μ)
2
2μ3 (
1
rA
− 1rP )
∂rP
∂cP
.
iii
Since cP = rP
h
1−
³
1−μ
2μ
´
log
³
1+μ
1−μ
´i
from equation 3.4, we have ∂rP∂cP ' 1μ , and
GcAcP =
(1− μ)2
2μ4
(
1
rA
− 1
rP
) (8.10)
GcAcP =
∂GcP
∂cA
=
∂(1− 1μ+
(1−μ)2
2μ3
(
rP
rA
−1−log rPrA ))
∂cA
= (1−μ)
2
2μ3 (−
∂r∗A
∂cA
rP
(r∗A)
2 +
1
r∗A
∂r∗A
∂cA
) < 0 since r∗A < rP .
Substituting for ∂r
∗
A
∂cA
from equation 8.6 and simplifying,
GcAcP =
(1− μ)2
2μ3
(
1− F (r∗A)
F (r∗A)
1
uH1
+
1
uL1
)
1
(r∗A)2
(r∗A − rP ) (8.11)
GcAcA =
∂GcA
∂cA
=
∂((1−F (r∗A))(λ1+λ2))
∂cA
= −f(r∗A)
∂r∗A
∂cA
(λ1+ λ2). Substituting for
∂r∗A
∂cA
from equation
8.6, and for λ1 + λ2 from equations 7.15 and 7.16, and simplifying,
GcAcA = −f(r∗A)(
1− F (r∗A)
F (r∗A)
1
uH1
+
1
uL1
)(
1
uL1
+ (2− F (r∗A))(
1
uH1
− 1
uL1
)) (8.12)
To show that d
2cA
dc2P
> 0 is equivalent to showing that 2GcPGcAcP −GcAGcP ,cP +(GcP )2
³
GcA,cA
GcA
´
is positive, from equation 8.9. The first term may be re-written as 2(−GcP )(−GcAcP ) where
−GcP > 0 (see discussion following equation ??), and −GcAcP > 0. Because −GcP = −1 + 1μ −
(1−μ)2
2μ3 (
rP
rA
− 1 − log rPrA ), it is sufficient to define −G
o
cP = −1 +
1
μ −
(1−μ)2
2μ3 (
rP
rA
− 1) and show
that 2GocPGcAcP −GcAGcP ,cP + (GcP )
2
³
GcA,cA
GcA
´
is positive. (Removing the log rPrA term makes the
computation easier.) Expanding the term 2GocPGcAcP − GcAGcP ,cP + (GcP )
2
³
GcA,cA
GcA
´
yields the
expression: (−1+μ)
2 (A+B+C)
8μ6 rA3 (rA−rP ) , where vH =
1
uH1
and vL = 1uL1
, and
A = (−1+μ) (rA−rP )
3 ((1−μ) rP (vH−vL)+rA ((−1+3μ) vH−(−1+μ) vL))
rP
B =
2 rP ((1−μ+2μ2) rA+(−1+μ) rP )
2
((−1+μ) rP (vH−vL)−rA ((−1+μ) vH+(1+μ) vL))
(1+μ) rA+(−1+μ) rP
C =
4 (−1+μ) (rA−rP )2 ((1−μ+2μ2) rA+(−1+μ) rP ) ((1−μ) rP (vH−vL)+rA ((−1+μ) vH+(1+μ) vL))
(1+μ) rA+(−1+μ) rP
Because (rA − rP ) < 0, the task is to show that (A+B + C) is negative. The denominator of
the common term that represents the sum (A+B +C) is
(1 + μ) rA − (1− μ) rP= (1− μ)
h
(1+μ)
(1−μ) rA − rP
i
= (1− μ)
h
rP
r0 rA − rP
i
> 0 since rA > r0.
Therefore the task reduces to proving that the numerator of the common term that represents the
sum (A+B + C) is negative. This numerator is given by:
−
h
(−1 + μ)3 rP 5 (vH − vL)
i
+
h
(−1 + μ)2 rA rP 4 (5 (−1 + μ) vH + (5− 3μ) vL)
i
+
£¡
−1 + μ2
¢
rA5 ((−1 + 3μ) vH − (−1 + μ) vL)
¤
+
£
(−1 + μ) rA4 rP ((1 + μ (−2 + μ (−19 + 8μ))) vH + (−1 + μ (2 + μ (7 + 8μ))) vL)
¤
+
£
4 rA2 rP 3
¡¡
2 + μ
¡
−6 + μ
¡
9− 7μ+ 2μ3
¢¢¢
vH − 2
¡
1 + μ
¡
−2 + μ
¡
2− 2μ+ μ3
¢¢¢
vL
¢¤
iv
−
"
4 rA3 rP 2
Ã
(−1 + μ) (−1 + 2 (−1 + μ) μ (−1 + μ (3 + μ))) vH
+(−1 + μ (1 + μ (−3 + μ (3 + 2μ (1 + μ))))) vL
!#
which, after suppressing terms with μ2 and higher powers of μ, simplifies to:
−
³
(rA − rP )2
¡
rA2 + 2 rA rP − rP 2
¢
((−1 + 3μ) (rA − rP ) vH − ((−1 + μ) rA + (1− 3μ) rP ) vL)
´
Because (rA − rP )2 > 0, the task reduces to proving that¡
rA2 + 2 rA rP − rP 2
¢
((−1 + 3μ) (rA − rP ) vH − ((−1 + μ) rA + (1− 3μ) rP ) vL) > 0.
This expression can be re-arranged as:
r2P
µ³
1 + rArP
´2
− 2
¶
[ (1− 3μ) (rP − rA) (vH − vL) + 2μ rA vL]
Since rP > rA, and by assumption, μ < 13 , we have
[ (1− 3μ) (rP − rA) (vH − vL) + 2μ rA vL] > 0
Further, the least value that
³
1 + rArP
´2
can take is when rA = r0, which implies that"µ
1 +
rA
rP
¶2
− 2
#
MIN
=
"µ
1 +
r0
rP
¶2
− 2
#
=
"µ
1 +
1− μ
1 + μ
¶2
− 2
#
=
∙
4
(1 + μ)2
− 2
¸
> 0∀μ <
√
2− 1.
Hence
∙³
1 + rArP
´2
− 2
¸
> 0 for each rA, rP , and
r2P
Ãµ
1 +
rA
rP
¶2
− 2
!
[ (1− 3μ) (rP − rA) (vH − vL) + 2μ rA vL] > 0, (8.13)
which completes the proof..
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